Overview
The Anti-Comintern Pact, officially the Agreement against the Communist International, was an anti-communist pact concluded between Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan on 25 November 1936 and directed against the Communist International (Comintern). It was signed by the German ambassador-at-large Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Japanese ambassador to Germany Kintomo Mushanokōji. Italy joined in 1937 (earlier it had signed the Italo-Soviet Pact, directed partly against Hitler), but it was legally recognized as an original signatory by the terms of its entry. Spain and Hungary joined in 1939. Other countries joined during World War II. The Japanese signatories had hoped that the Anti-Comintern Pact would effectively be an alliance against the Soviet Union, which was how the Soviets perceived it.
There was also a secret additional protocol which specified a joint German-Japanese policy specifically aimed against the Soviet Union. After August 1939, Japan distanced itself from Germany as a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The Anti-Comintern Pact was followed by the September 1940 Tripartite Pact, which identified the United States as the primary threat rather than the Soviet Union, although in theory applying to the Soviets as well; however, by December 1941, this too was virtually inoperative. The Anti-Comintern Pact was subsequently renewed in November 1941 and saw the entry of several new members into the pact. The Anti-Comintern Pact ceased to exist with the end of World War II.
"Anti-Komintern" (GDAV)
The Anti-Komintern, officially the Gesamtverband Deutscher antikommunistischer Vereinigungen (abbr. GDAV, 'general association of German anti-communist federations'), was a German agency established by Joseph Goebbels in 1933. Its activities covered a wide range of operations designed to denounce communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular, push antisemitic propaganda and garner domestic and international support for Nazi policy. It was placed under the leadership Dr. Adolf Ehrt de . Under Ehrt's leadership, the Comintern was denounced as 'godless' in reference to its atheism. Beginning in July 1936, the Spanish Civil War became a main focus for the Anti-Komintern's publications.
One of the Anti-Komintern's most significant outputs was the 1936 international release Der Weltbolschewismus, in which it connected various anti-communist and anti-semitic conspiracy theories for the consumption of the international audience. The book was not released in Germany itself to avoid conflict between the book's varied accounts with German state propaganda.
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
On 18 June 1935, the United Kingdom and Germany signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which came as a surprise to the Japanese. This marked the beginning of a series of attempts by Adolf Hitler to improve relations between the two countries. In Hitler's mind, a positive relationship towards the United Kingdom would weaken Britain's allies France and Italy (at that point still a German rival) and contain the Soviet Union. Hitler would later also send Ribbentrop to London with the specific task of securing British membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact during his 1936–1938 tenure as German ambassador to the United Kingdom, declaring British accession into the pact as his 'greatest wish'. In Japan, the treaty was viewed with suspicion.
Mushanokōji on 4 July 1935 in an embassy meeting stated his opinion that it would be unwise for Japan to rush into an alliance with Germany, as he (correctly) interpreted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as a German attempt to ally the UK. The United States and Britain had been hostile towards Japan ever since the Mukden Incident of 1931, and Mushanokōji feared that Japan might isolate itself if Germany ended up choosing a partnership with Britain over a partnership with Japan.
Competing authorities and ideologies in German foreign policy
The execution of German foreign policy was nominally left to Konstantin von Neurath's foreign ministry, but Joachim von Ribbentrop headed the semi-autonomous Dienststelle Ribbentrop, created in late 1934, where he could carry out Hitler's personal foreign policy requests independently from foreign ministry consent. This created a rivalry between the two services. While Ribbentrop was Hitler's personal diplomat of choice, his personal view on geostrategic diplomacy varied quite distinctly from Hitler's during the late 1930s. Whereas Hitler favored a friendly policy towards Britain to eliminate the Soviet Union, When it came to Japan, Ribbentrop believed that the Japanese focus on the Soviet Union as its main antagonist could be redirected towards the United Kingdom also, thus enabling Japan to be a partner in Ribbentrop's anti-British coalition.
German-Soviet interwar treaties
During the time of the Weimar Republic, the German government had made major treaties with the USSR, including the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo and the 1926 Treaty of Berlin. Germany was already agitating against the Soviet Union in 1935 when after a previous German–Polish declaration of non-aggression, through Hermann Goring proposed a military alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union, but this was rejected. Germany made later approaches to Poland nevertheless. In a note on the day of the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, 25 November 1936, Ribbentrop informed Mushanokōji that the German government viewed these two treaties' terms as void under the secret additional protocol. Mushanokōji replied on the same day, expressing the Japanese government's "sincere satisfaction" with the German stance.
This had been partially a result of the Japanese government's insistence, most notably in a request on 24 July 1936, to clarify the treaty's implications for past bilateral treaties between either party and the Soviet Union.
Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, Washington Naval Conference of 1922
Japan had fought in the Great War on the side of the victorious Entente Powers. However, as part of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, the United States and United Kingdom successfully managed to both limit Japan's naval forces by treaty and to force Japan to surrender her gains in China made during World War I. While there were some advantages for Tokyo gained during the conference – it was granted parity with US and UK in the Pacific Ocean and was entitled to build a navy that would outmatch the French and Italian navies, as well as being recognized as the world's only non-western colonial power – the treaty was unpopular in Japan. Japanese nationalists, as well as the Imperial Japanese Navy, denounced the treaty's restrictive aspects.
Culturally, the 1922 Washington Treaty was viewed as yet another betrayal by the Western powers, after the Japanese proposals for guaranteed racial equality under the League of Nations had been rejected in 1919. German historian Bernd Martin dubbed the Washington Naval Conference the "Japanese 'Versailles'."
Japanese societal militarization and aggression against China
during the 1931 Mukden Incident The Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 began the period of Japanese aggression in Asia between 1931 and 1945, sometimes called the Fifteen Years War. The diplomatic reaction of the European great powers to Japan's attack against China was insufficient to stop the Japanese advance, despite continued Chinese appeals to the League of Nations.
This attack, which had no central order from Tokyo precede it and was rather an autonomous decision by the Kwantung Army leadership, Following the Lytton Report, which laid the blame for the conflict in Manchuria firmly at the feet of the Japanese, Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, failed to condemn Japan in his speech on 7 December 1932, and subsequently earned the favor of Japanese politicians such as Yōsuke Matsuoka, who viewed the lackluster British response as further encouragement for the Japanese course in China. Japan left the League of Nations as a result of the Lytton Report in February 1933. The Tanggu Truce ended the hostilities in Manchuria, but Japanese ambition in China was not yet satisfied. Between 1933 and 1936, Japanese foreign minister Kōki Hirota pursued the , the "friendly diplomacy of Hirota".
Summed up by the Amau Doctrine of 1934, Japan viewed itself as the protective power of all of East Asia, mirroring the role of the United States in the Americas under the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. This posturing was again permitted by the European great powers, and Neville Chamberlain even attempted to negotiate an Anglo–Japanese non-aggression pact to improve British relations with Japan in 1934. In secret, Hirota's foreign policy leadership set an array of highly ambitious goals for Japan's diplomacy. This included an industrial buildup in Manchukuo, the acquisition of resources from North China via subjugation, conquest of the western Pacific and South East Asia, and preparations for a war against the Soviet Union.
The Japanese army in October 1934 published a pamphlet entitled "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It", going directly against the attempt of diplomatic reconciliation that was at the same time (at least half-heartedly) attempted by the civilian government in Tokyo (named "Shidehara diplomacy" after former Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara). The pamphlet demanded a complete subjugation of all aspects of foreign and domestic policy to the all-encompassing question of "national defense" and the nation's preparation for total war. It further denounced "cooperative diplomacy", lauded the Japanese decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, and called upon Japan to accept its fate and to formulate a great plan for the next 100 years.
The military subsequently continued its practice of publishing pamphlets with overt political content without prior coordination with the civilian government. In November 1936, about the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact's conclusion, the army pamphlet "Perfecting the Army's Preparedness and the Spirit Required" advocated strengthening the army and openly called for the reform of the civilian government and the reform of the Japanese state to better suit the military's goals.
Domestic power struggles about Japanese foreign policy
The Japanese imperial state's system was dubbed "a cone without vertex" by Japanese historian Ken Ishida. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the Japanese foreign ministry each had its own agenda with regards as to how Japan should orient its foreign policy. The Japanese system, highly traditional and based around the spiritual and socio-cultural value of Emperor Hirohito, also involved the imperial court, which served as a buffer between these three rival groups and the Emperor at the top, which allowed Hirohito to escape direct political responsibilities for any failures and setbacks that the system might produce.
Japanese–Soviet fishery treaty negotiations and border disputes
At the time of the negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Japanese government was also in negotiations with the Soviet government over fishing rights in the Sea of Japan. As the Anti-Comintern Pact's secret additional protocol between Germany and Japan against the USSR was to forbid political treaties by either state with the Soviet Union without the express consent of the other party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese ambassador Mushanokōji was concerned whether the Pact would result in consequences for the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. He inquired about it in a letter to Ribbentrop after the signing of the treaty on 25 November, and also mentioned the issue of border questions between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and the USSR.
Ribbentrop confirmed the German government's assent that Japan was autonomous and free to proceed in the matters mentioned by Mushanokōji his reply on the same day.
Ideological similarities and contradictions between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan
The Anti-Comintern Pact was more of a statement than an actual political commitment, and the statement was one of mutual ideological alignment and diplomatic attachment to one another. Both countries shared examples of very politically significant racial ideologies, with Alfred Rosenberg in Germany and Shūmei Ōkawa in Japan becoming the leading racialist ideologues. Whereas Rosenberg enjoyed government backing and was a central party figure after the Nazis' rise to power in 1933, Ōkawa's audience was more limited. Ōkawa found his main support base with young nationalistic military officers, particularly those in the Kwantung Army, the military unit that instigated Japan's initial invasion of North East China in 1931.
To prevent diplomatic complications as a result of German racial thought, German racist propaganda in the state-controlled press was directed away from the topic of the Japanese people so as to not irritate Japan.
Seventh World Congress of the Comintern
At the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in July 1935, following the advice of Georgi Dimitrov to the Soviet government that had resulted from Dimitrov's experiences in France and Austria during 1934, the Communist International drastically changed the course that communist parties were advised to take in democratic systems. Instead of viewing the democratic and fascist parties as politically allied ("social fascism"), the communist movements were encouraged to ally with leftist and centrist forces (the policy of the popular front) in order to prevent the rightists from gaining ground. Diplomatically, the Seventh World Congress also brought on the "collective security" policy in the Soviet Union, wherein the USSR would attempt to align with the western democracies to counteract the fascist regimes.
Role of China in German–Japanese relations
The Republic of China was an important partner to the Germans, but a bitter enemy of the Japanese Empire, as Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1931. Although Ribbentrop hoped to involve both China and Japan in his anti-communist bloc, the continued hostilities and eventual outbreak of war made the ambivalent German position, including the Sino–German military cooperation and the status of Alexander von Falkenhausen and other military advisors to Chiang Kai-shek, a serious concern to both of the Asian states. Furthermore, China was the biggest trade partner for German businesses in Asia. For their part, the Japanese political and military establishments were by 1934 also less than certain about the usefulness of the new Hitler government in Germany, which Tokyo assumed would attempt to maintain a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and avoid any open alignment with Moscow's enemies.
The distrust that Japan felt was partially caused by the close relationship between Germany and China, which in turn was perceived as an ally of the Soviet Union against Japan. China eventually declared war on Germany and Italy, along with Japan, on 9 December 1941, in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entry into World War II, citing German and Italian support for Japanese aggression as the reason.
Instability in France
The domestic situation in the French Third Republic was unstable. This provided the opportunity for France's rivals, especially Germany, to expand their influence, while at the same time weakening France's European partners, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. The cabinet of Léon Blum, supported by France's popular front, had taken the reins in June 1936. The social instability and political violence within France made the French government careful and ineffective in applying France's otherwise extensive diplomatic and military power. Hitler, who expected France's popular front to result in a situation similar to the Spanish Civil War, openly announced to the French ambassador on 6 October 1936 that a communist takeover in France would not be treated by Germany as a domestic affair.
In French foreign policy, the 1934 German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact had caused concerns about the stability of the French alliance system in eastern Europe, leading to a French realignment towards the Soviet Union that resulted in the 1936 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
German, Italian, and Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War, in which Germany supported the Nationalists and the Soviet Union the Republicans, reinforced the urgency in the mind of the German leadership to create some sort of anti-Soviet military arrangement to counteract a potential aggression by the Soviet Union. The Spanish Civil War was viewed by the Germans as concrete proof that the teachings of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, which had been specifically aimed against Germany (and Japan), were indeed affecting geopolitics.
Early designs by Dienststelle Ribbentrop and Hiroshi Ōshima
After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Seventh World Congress, the German Dienststelle Ribbentrop envisioned in October 1935 an anti-communist diplomatic system that might involve both the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. This idea had support on the Japanese side by Hiroshi Ōshima, then the military attaché for Japan in Berlin, although Ōshima was more concerned with a Japanese subjugation of China rather than with an equal Sino–Japanese alliance against the Soviet Union. Originally, the treaty was scheduled for November 1935, and invitations were to be extended to China, the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland. However, the German military and diplomatic leadership stalled the treaty's realization, as they feared a breakdown in the German relations with China. Historian Carl Boyd interprets this as a reference to the contact with Ōshima established via Hack.
With Hitler's tentative approval (Hitler was uncertain of Ōshima's authority and wanted Ribbentrop to ascertain the opinions of the higher-ups in the Japanese military establishment), negotiations between Ōshima and Ribbentrop went into full swing in fall of 1935.
1935
Starting with the meetings in October, which at some point involved Hitler himself, Ōshima presented his idea of a promise of mutual assistance in case of an attack on one of the two countries by the Soviet Union. At this point, Ōshima's telegrams to the Japanese army were enthusiastic about the diplomatic potential of the negotiations, up to and including the possibility of an open German–Japanese military alliance, even though both sides were more immediately comfortable at that point with a less impactful agreement to not aid the Soviet Union in case of a Soviet war against the other party.
Such a 'no aid'-agreement was easier to fit into each country's respective grand strategies. Ōshima's extensive involvement was essential to the formation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but was also the source of some discomfort among the Japanese military and diplomatic leaderships, as Ōshima had far overextended his military assignment with his unauthorized diplomatic cooperation with Ribbentrop and even Hitler himself. But instead of the severe punishment that a junior officer like Ōshima might have otherwise received for his reckless dealings with a foreign head of government, Ōshima's advance was acknowledged positively by the Japanese hyper-militarists, who were sympathetic to Hitler's policies and impressed by Ōshima's successes.
In late October 1935, the chief of the Japanese army's general staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito, signalled that the army was positively disposed towards a pact with Germany. Kotohito had been a close associate of Hiroshi Ōshima's father Ken'ichi Ōshima, Japan's Minister of the Army in 1916–1918, and was thus positively predisposed towards Hiroshi Ōshima's activity in Europe, and likely one of Ōshima's protectors in the question of Ōshima overstepping his initial assignments. Kotohito assigned a general staff intelligence officer, Tadaichi Wakamatsu, with a mission in Berlin that involved ascertaining the German attitude towards a German–Japanese agreement directed against the Soviet Union. Meetings between Wakamatsu, Ōshima and Blomberg in November and December 1935 achieved little, although Wakamatsu signalled the general willingness of the Japanese army to negotiate a treaty with Germany.
He was sceptical of the Dienststelle's semi-official status within the German foreign service. The IJA in principle remained open to the idea, and Wakamatsu left Germany for Japan in December 1935 with the understanding that both sides would seek government approval for the pact. Wakamatsu and Kotohito were overall unprepared to deal with the remarkable progress that Ōshima reported in his messages and the potential magnitude of the resulting German–Japanese treaty. Near the end of 1935, Soviet Red Army intelligence intercepted several secret telegrams between Ōshima and the Japanese General Staff. This information was forwarded to the Soviet embassy in Japan, from which the American embassy also heard news of the ongoing secret negotiations between Germany and Japan.
This marked the first time that the Soviet Union is confirmed to have received word of the ongoing negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
1936
The inconsistencies between the German foreign ministry and Dienststelle Ribbentrop showed themselves again in the course of the negotiations. Dirksen, ambassador in Tokyo, was informed about the ongoing talks not by the German foreign service, but instead by the Japanese General Staff. German foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath, when informed about the situation by Hitler, argued against the creation of a German–Japanese pact. Firstly, he was concerned with Sino–German relations and thought Japan less important to Germany than China, and secondly, he wanted to avoid having foreign policy authority slip away from the foreign ministry towards Dienststelle Ribbentrop, where he saw Ribbentrop as a rival to his own position.
In Japan, the matter was stalled, as the important documents got lost between January and February 1936 in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Japanese foreign ministry, as they were discarded by low-ranking officials before reaching foreign minister Kōki Hirota or his deputy Mamoru Shigemitsu. the German diplomatic ambivalence between the ideological proximity and military potential of Japan and the economic value of China continued, and Neurath remained in favor of German alignment with China. In April 1936, Germany signed a major commercial treaty with China and gave them a credit of 100,000,000 marks for China to purchase German industrial and other products. It was Hitler himself who, unbeknownst to Neurath and the foreign ministry, began to reassess the importance of China and Japan in German foreign relations over the course of the summer of 1936.
Hitler sanctioned new negotiations with the Japanese. Later that year, when German military attaché in Tokyo Eugen Ott temporarily returned to Germany to attend army maneuvers, he expressed his optimism about the Japanese army's willingness to conclude the pact to Hitler. Terauchi in May 1936 informed Ōshima that the army was yielding control of the negotiations to the foreign ministry in order to restore harmony between the two factions, but unofficially, Ōshima would remain Japan's key negotiator and Mushanokōji's role would be more ceremonial. In July, Mushanokōji requested a draft of the proposed treaty from Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which was drawn up by one of the Dienststelle 's East Asian specialists, Dr. Hermann von Raumer.
But instead of taking this draft immediately to Mushanokōji, Raumer, who probably acted on Ribbentrop's instructions, first presented it to Ōshima, who was attending the Bayreuth Festival at the time. On 22 July, Ōshima, Ribbentrop, Raumer and Hitler met in Bayreuth, where Hitler made some personal edits to Raumer's draft. Only then was the draft shown to ambassador Mushanokōji.
Japanese objections and final adjustments
This initial draft signed off on by Hitler appears to be lost to history, as the Japanese ambassador made some changes to it that were intended, according to Shigenori Tōgō's testimony at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, to make it less 'propagandistic' and more 'business-like'. Tōgō, acting on behalf of Arita, who was once again Japanese foreign minister, wanted to scrap all of Hitler's envisioned military provisions. Because Hitler's draft was lost, it is impossible to say what these were, but from the context, it seems likely that they were both a defensive as well as an offensive alliance against the Soviet Union, because Tōgō, when he was unable to have all military provisions scrapped outright, instead took the position that any such provisions should be purely defensive, implying that they were offensive as well at some point.
Some minor adjustments were still made between August and October, when the pact was formally initialed. Its length was reduced to 5 years, down from 10 as had originally been planned. And, against Ōshima's and Hitler's hopes, the military leadership in Japan insisted that the military provisions could be only defensive and not offensive, even if agreed upon in a secret addendum. The military leadership was concerned that, if Japan was caught in a war against China, an offensive clause to the treaty would diplomatically force Japan into a war against the Soviet Union that it was militarily unwilling to fight. As a result, the first article of the secret additional protocol spoke specifically of "unprovoked attack" by the Soviet Union and had no offensive provisions.
On the other hand, the Japanese side was unable to gain the upper hand on the topic of the pact's publication, which was advocated for by the Germans and which Japan had attempted to avoid. Furthermore, the secret protocol remained explicitly aimed at the Soviet Union, something that the Japanese had felt was an ineffective provision. The treaty draft was finalized on 23 October 1936.
Approval by the Japanese Privy Council and by Adolf Hitler
The Anti-Comintern Pact required the approval of the Privy Council of Japan to allow Japanese accession to the treaty. Prime Minister Hirota had expressed his personal relief upon hearing the treaty draft's conclusion on 23 October 1936, and compared the achievement of the IJA in its advancement of the Anti-Comintern Pact to the IJN's success in forging the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The elder Japanese statesman Saionji Kinmochi, last of the genrō, had disagreed with the Japanese government's diplomatic step and denounced the Anti-Comintern Pact as exclusively useful to Germany and as without benefit for Japan. Kinmochi instead would have preferred a diplomatic course more in line with Japanese public opinion and geography, both of which made a positive relationship with UK and USA desirable. However, Kinmochi's critical stance remained unheard in the Privy Council.
In the view of the proponents of the treaty within Japan, spearheaded by the IJA, Japan was militarily threatened by the Soviet Union's meddling in China, just as Germany was threatened by Soviet support for France and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, both countries feared subversion by communist forces. This, as a result, made Germany and Japan natural allies against the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The opponents, who gathered around the IJN, cited the likelihood that the Anti-Comintern Pact would increase rather than decrease the threat posed by the USSR and that there would be considerable domestic resistance against the agreement. Ultimately, the supporters won out in the discussions that took place on 13 November and 18 November, and the Privy Council gave the treaty its unanimous support on 25 November 1936.
On the German side, all that was required for German accession to the pact was Hitler's approval, which was given quickly, and subsequently supported by a wave of anti-communist propaganda in the state-controlled German press.
Signing
The treaty, which outlined a joint German and Japanese policy to counteract the activities of the Communist Internationale, was initially to be in force for five years, until November 1941. Two additional protocols were signed, one of which was public. The other, which was specifically aimed against the Soviet Union, was secret. The treaty was signed in the offices of Dienststelle Ribbentrop rather than the German foreign ministry. Ribbentrop, in his Nuremberg testimony, attributed this to Hitler's desire to avoid the usage of official channels of German politics for what Ribbentrop referred to as an "ideological question" rather than a political one.
Main agreement
The full text was considered in its original form in both the German and Japanese versions, and the date was specified in both countries' versions as 25 November 1936 as well as 25 November in the 11th year of the Shōwa period. The agreement bears the signatures of German ambassador-at-large Ribbentrop and Japanese ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji. The initial length of the treaty was specified to be five years. This reduced length was one of the concessions made after the objections of the Japanese foreign ministry to the initial Bayreuth draft of the treaty, in which the treaty was at first supposed to have a duration of ten years. In the first article of the treaty, Germany and Japan agreed to share information about Comintern activities and to plan their operations against such activities jointly.
In the second article, the two parties opened the possibility of extending the pact to other countries "whose domestic peace is endangered by the disruptive activities of the Communist Internationale". Such invitations to third parties would be undertaken jointly and after the expressed consent by both parties. German state media referred to this provision of endangerment by Comintern disruption when, among other examples, the Völkischer Beobachter recounted various communist activities in Hungary and Manchukuo as the reason for the two countries to join the pact in February 1939.
Protocol supplement
A supplementary protocol was signed along with the agreement on the same day, 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11. Just like the main agreement, it bears the signatures of Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji. In the first article, German and Japan agreed to have their competent authorities "closely co-operate in the exchange of reports on the activities of ... and on measures of information and defense against" the Comintern. The two contracting parties also agreed, in the second article, to have their competent authorities "within the framework of the existing law ... take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work on direct or indirect duty" of the Comintern.
Secret additional protocol
In addition to the main treaty and the public additional protocol ("Protocol Supplement"), there was also another additional protocol on 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11, this one kept in strict secrecy from the public, which specifically dealt with the establishment of Germany's and Japan's military and diplomatic partnership against the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was alluded to with the public protocol's references to Comintern activity, the secret additional protocol is the only one where the USSR is actually mentioned by name. Just like the main agreement and the public additional protocol, the secret additional protocol was signed by Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji. Due to its covert nature, the secret additional protocol remained exclusive between Germany and Japan, whereas other countries joined only the two public clauses of the treaty.
Starting with Italy, the other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact did not sign the secret additional protocol.
Reactions
To the international community, the Anti-Comintern Pact signalled the beginning of the German–Japanese partnership,
China
The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was a direct threat to China, which relied on German military assistance against the threat of the imminent Japanese invasion. The German foreign ministry, which had been opposed to Dienststelle Ribbentrop's alignment with Japan, made significant efforts to reassure China of German assistance. This lasted until the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in July 1937, after which Germany, keeping with Ribbentrop's agenda, aligned clearly with Japan, including the German compliance with Japanese requests to recall the military mission of Alexander von Falkenhausen.
France
In France, the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially after Italy's entry, was viewed as a German power grab in Eastern Europe, particularly to the detriment of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Germany
The German public was informed of the treaty's entry into legislation by the German Reichsgesetzblatt in 1937. Ribbentrop justified the Anti-Comintern Pact as a joint German–Japanese act to defend Western civilization. The German government launched a pro-Japanese publicity campaign to improve the general opinion of the German public about Japan.
Italy
The Italian government, which had still viewed Germany as a potential rival well into the year 1935, had initially abstained from the negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Japan
The Japanese public as a whole did not receive the Anti-Comintern Pact with any particular enthusiasm. In the aftermath of the agreement, the influx of national socialist ideology into Japanese society after the alignment with Germany caused an increase in antisemitism in Japan. was the treaty's main proponent. Prince Kotohito had signalled the army's positive predisposition towards Ōshima's efforts in Berlin. The Japanese navy would have preferred to avoid the treaty if that meant a better relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom as a result.
Soviet Union
Publicly, the Soviet government attempted to downplay the significance of the pact. Litvinov had also, in speaking to the All-Union Congress of Soviets on 26 November, cast doubt on the completeness of the treaty as presented to the public, declaring it to be "only a camouflage for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed". Yurenev had even contacted Japanese foreign minister Arita before the pact's publication, on 16 November and 20 November. While Arita had on the first request dodged the issue by pointing to the fact that the negotiations were only concerned with the Comintern and not the Soviet Union, he did not respond to the latter contact by Yurenev, in which the ambassador accused the Japanese foreign service of holding secret negotiations with Germany specifically aimed against the USSR.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom also saw its colonial empire in Asia and eventually Africa threatened by the Japanese and later also the Italian alliance with Germany. This view was not completely unjustified in the context of the Axis Powers' navies, as the naval high commands of Germany, Italy and Japan mainly aimed their common considerations against the United Kingdom, not the Soviet Union. In the House of Commons, the Anti-Comintern Pact became a subject of debate multiple times. The British armed forces were concerned about a potential military conflict with Germany and Japan, and this feeling was escalated upon Italian accession to the agreement.
United States
In the United States, the German-Japanese agreement was viewed as an indication that Germany might follow Japan's path of satisfying territorial claims with military action, as Japan had done in Manchuria in 1931. In a September 1937 report to the Treasury (after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War), it was argued that the long-term consequence of a Japanese victory in China would result in other "dissatisfied" powers, such as Germany and Italy, seeking the fulfillment of their objectives in military endeavors of their own. The American armed forces were concerned about the prospect of Japan gaining military allies in the form of Germany and later Italy, as that posed a potential threat to the American War Plan Orange.
In 1937, American ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew analyzed the Anti-Comintern Pact's anti-communist rhetoric as a mere banner for "have-not" countries to unite under while in truth aiming primarily against the British Empire's global dominance. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. president from 1933 to 1945, shared French concerns about the safety of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Roosevelt believed that the pact contained secret clauses outlining an alliance that was both defensive and offensive, and that it divided the world into spheres of influence for each of the signatories. Eventually, the USS Panay incident of 1937 resulted in the President's attempt to break the Anti-Comintern Pact by appeasing Germany and Italy with the goal of isolating Japan from its allies to hinder its progress in China.
Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs that " n othing could have been more logical and natural than an alliance of Berlin and Tokyo", citing shared values of militarism, conquest and disregard for international treaties as the reason for his conclusion.
Expansion and adaptations
The Anti-Comintern Pact's original provisions had included a specific provision that allowed Germany and Japan to jointly invite additional members into the pact. In Japan, the Anti-Comintern Pact was seen as possibly groundbreaking in freeing the country from its international isolation and to acquire new diplomatic and military partners. Countries whose membership Japan was interested in included the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and especially Poland.
Second Sino-Japanese War
The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan met its first trial when Japan and China, both of whom were important partners with Germany, went to war. The Second Sino-Japanese War, provoked by the Japanese forces through the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, forced Germany to reassess the balance of its economic relationship with China and its ideological and military alignment with Japan. It was evident that Germany would have to abandon one of its partners in favor of the other, and made the decision to favor Japan over China, although Hitler himself had as late as 1936 personally still assured the Chinese ambassador that Germany would maintain the two countries' important relationship. it made no particular effort, diplomatic or otherwise, to stop the Japanese aggression against China.
The German government and foreign service still remained privately critical of the Japanese course of action. When Japanese ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji explained to state secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that the Japanese invasion of China kept in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact in its attempt to vanquish Chinese communism, Weizsäcker dismissed Mushanokōji's explanation on the basis of the German view that the Japanese action would foster rather than stifle the growth of communism in China. Weizsäcker, in his notes with regards to this conversation with Mushanokōji, expressed the fear that the Japanese aggression could lead directly to an alliance between the Soviet Union and China.
Entry of Italy
On 6 November 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. By 1937, the Italian interest in the pact had changed, as the Mussolini administration desired to have its own military alliance with Japan and felt that accession to the agreement would be the easiest way to forge the triangular alliance with Germany and Japan that the Italian government desired. Ciano commented in his diary on 2 November 1937 that the pact, while anti-communist in name, was instead "clearly anti-British". The protocol of Italy's entry was signed on 6 November 1937. As a result of the phrasing of the treaty, from a purely legal argument, Italy was required to only adhere to the main text and the public supplementary protocol, but not to the secret protocol that had the specific military directives against the Soviet Union.
In reaction to the Italian accession to the pact, the British government saw the traditional British dominance in the Mediterranean (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt (Suez Canal)) threatened by a potentially resurgent Italy backed with German industrial and military power. Robert Vansittart, a prominent critic of the British Appeasement policy under Neville Chamberlain, warned that Italy, with its recent acquisitions in the war against Ethiopia, threatened a pincer movement against Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and that Mussolini, due to his personality, could not be deterred even by Italy's economic instability from a potential military adventure against the United Kingdom.
Attempts to develop the pact into a military alliance
After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact and especially after Italy's entry, Ribbentrop continued his efforts to form it into a full military alliance. In this military-political purge, Hitler removed twelve generals (not counting Blomberg and Fritsch) and reassigned 51 other military posts. Mussolini, who had by now given up his attempts at Italian diplomatic ambivalence between the United Kingdom and Germany and fully committed to Italian alliance with Germany, The overall Japanese attitude, still anti-Soviet rather than anti-British, did not fit with the German and Italian designs to openly antagonize the United Kingdom. The Japanese foreign service did not wish to be drawn into a war between the nations of Western Europe and as a result aimed to differentiate between the Axis Powers' designs against the UK and those against the USSR.
Ribbentrop's designs were thus rejected by the Japanese delegates, who insisted on the Anti-Comintern Pact's initial anti-communist designs and were unwilling to see an anti-British component added to it. Eventually, Japanese caution led Ribbentrop to settle for only a bilateral alliance rather than the trilateral one he had hoped for, and the Pact of Steel was signed between Germany and Italy on 22 May 1939. The Pact of Steel's capabilities were commented on by Ciano as "real dynamite". The Pact of Steel enabled Germany to proceed in its aggressive posturing against Poland, as this issue did not necessarily require Japanese consent or support, but Ribbentrop also desired to expand the Pact of Steel and include Japan in it. However, Japanese stalling tactics continued, and Germany wanted to eliminate the Soviet Union as a potential factor in its war against Poland.
As a result, Ribbentrop started seriously pondering a quid pro quo with the USSR on the question of Eastern Europe's future. This would mark a complete betrayal of the Anti-Comintern Pact's provision to not make bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union without Japanese consent, but Germany proceeded nonetheless. In May 1939, Ribbentrop instructed Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg to initiate a German-Soviet rapprochement on the basis that the newly forged Pact of Steel marked a turn in Germany's foreign policy, away from anti-Soviet towards anti-British and anti-French diplomacy. Ribbentrop also promised to redirect Japanese anti-Soviet foreign policy into a state where Japan and the USSR would no longer have to stand in rivalry.
At this stage, Ribbentrop also started envisioning a bloc of four, where the Soviet Union would be included with Germany, Italy and Japan to form a quadripartite faction against British influence. This marked a complete deviation from Nazi policy, particularly the Hitlerian goal of Lebensraum, and was one of the many iterations of Ribbentrop's all-encompassing foreign political goal of containing by all possible means the influence of the United Kingdom. This Euro-Asiatic bloc of four, as historian Wolfgang Michalka calls it, ultimately failed because of the differences between Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan. Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939.
Entry of Hungary and Manchukuo
Hungary joined the agreement on 24 February 1939. It was the first member with some independence outside of the big three, and it was subsequently the first country to be denied first-class status among the pact's members, thus establishing the division between Germany, Italy and Japan as the leading nations of the pact and the remaining countries as their subordinates. This superior status of the three leading countries was later formalized in the extension of the pact on 25 November 1941. In his memoirs, Hungary's strongman Miklós Horthy would later complain that Germany had unduly involved itself in Hungarian domestic affairs even before Hungary's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and that German media had no place to insist that Hungary had a 'bill to pay' after profiting from German diplomatic intervention on her behalf during the First Vienna Award.
Entry of Spain
Francisco Franco's Spain joined the pact on 27 March 1939, the same day that the surrender of the Spanish Republicans at the end of the Siege of Madrid brought about the end of the Spanish Civil War. The British government, after nationalist victory had become obvious, had attempted to quickly improve relations with the new government in Madrid, but the progress on Anglo-Spanish relations received a setback with the Spanish entry into the pact. France, although nominally also interested in positive relations with the falangists as seen in the Bérard-Jordana Agreement of 25 February 1939, made even less headway than the British.
After Spanish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact, there was a Spanish military buildup in colonial Morocco, and the Franco government further worsened tensions by refusing to allow the re-entry of refugees that had fled the country in the closing days of the Spanish Civil War.
Other considerations, 1938–1939
A candidate for membership in the eyes of the Axis Powers was the Second Polish Republic. Poland had cooperated with Germany on the occupations of Czechoslovak territory after the Munich Agreement and seemed like an approachable partner, but the German offers of a Polish membership in the pact were tied to a return of Danzig to Germany, something that Poland was unwilling to accept out of concern for its access to the sea and its policy of equal diplomatic distance between Germany and the Soviet Union. In January 1939, the Axis Powers were courting the Stojadinović government in Yugoslavia to attempt to induce Yugoslavia to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. which came as a surprise to the Axis Powers, who had believed Stojadinović was secure in office. While there were hopes among the Axis that Stojadinović might return to power, this failed to materialize.
In February 1939, the German military leadership, independent from the foreign ministry, increased the pressure on Bulgaria to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Generalmajor Georg Thomas explained to the Bulgarian delegation during negotiations regarding German armament loans to Bulgaria that such loans could only be extended if Bulgaria made a clear political showing of alignment to Germany in form of joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. Weizsäcker complained to the Wehrmacht high command about this incident. Thomas subsequently claimed to Weizsäcker that he was acting on the direct orders of Hermann Göring. In a subsequent conversation between the Bulgarian delegate and Weizsäcker, it was made clear that Bulgaria was not prepared to join the Anti-Comintern Pact at that time. Bulgaria would not join the agreement until 25 November 1941.
In the run up to the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the rump territories of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak accession into the Anti-Comintern Pact was part of the numerous demands Hitler made on the Czechs as a pretext to justify the invasion after the inevitable non-compliance.
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
The pact's legitimacy was undermined when Germany blatantly broke it by secretly negotiating the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union. During the negotiations between Ribbentrop and Stalin in Moscow in August 1939, just a few weeks before the outbreak of World War II, the Anti-Comintern Pact proved only a small obstacle. Ribbentrop told Stalin that the Anti-Comintern Pact had been aimed against the Western democracies, not the Soviet Union. Stalin accepted this for the sake of his country's diplomatic goals, and there were jokes made among the German public that the Soviet Union would end up joining the Anti-Comintern Pact itself.
Italy
On the backdrop of the preparations for World War II, the Italian reaction to Germany's actions was ambivalent. The Italian population's pre-existing anti-German and anti-war sentiments were not helped at all by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact,
Japan
, Fumimaro Konoe and Benito Mussolini In the Japanese view, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as Germany had not revealed its negotiations with the USSR to Japan. Subsequently, the Japanese sought to settle the Soviet–Japanese Border War and abandoned any territorial aspirations against the Soviet Union. Starting with the German-Soviet War, the Japanese loss of interest in war with the USSR had the consequence that Japan was unwilling to open up a second front against the Soviet Union to relieve German efforts, as Japan interpreted Germany's aggression as an insufficient reason to trigger the treaty.
As a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, there was a significant cooling of German–Japanese relations between late 1939 and the summer of 1940, but after Germany's victories in 1940, the elimination of the French and Dutch colonial powers caused Japan, interested in the acquisition of the colonies in question, to approach Germany again.
During World War II
All further additions to the Anti-Comintern Pact were after 1 September 1939 and thus during World War II. The supposed purpose of the pact, as a defensive coalition against communism to counteract the potential of Soviet aggression, became outdated when most of its European member states became engaged in the German–Soviet War.
Effect of German military victories in the Westfeldzug
In March 1940, Joachim von Ribbentrop once again set about mobilizing Italy, the Soviet Union and especially Japan for his vision of a four-power coalition against the British Empire. In June 1940, the overwhelming German victories in the ("Western Campaign") saw the defeat of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. With French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies now effectively defenseless, the Tokyo government now felt enticed to once again diplomatically approach Germany, which it had previously distanced itself from after the German quid pro quo with the USSR. The Germans had also won some support with the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, Hiroshi Ōshima and Toshio Shiratori, who were swayed by Germany's successes in the Polish campaign and started supporting Ribbentrop's diplomatic agenda. in French Indochina in 1940.
Japan, concerned that Germany might actually take the side of France and the Netherlands, possibly then reshaped to be German vassal states, in the colonial question, sought to assure Germany's support for a Japanese annexation of French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. Ribbentrop was indeed willing to support such Japanese annexations, which had been part of his initial idea regarding the four-power pact's advantages from the Japanese perspective. He painted Japanese acquisitions in East Asia as preparations for a world order where all of Afro-Eurasia would be divided between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union. Again, Ribbentrop thus tried to realize his vision of a four-power coalition directed against the United Kingdom.
With France eliminated and the Battle of Britain going in Britain's favor, it became more and more clear that the United Kingdom, although on the back foot, would neither seek a truce nor be knocked out by German invasion. As a result, the role of the still neutral United States and the American support for the UK became more and more important for the conduct of Germany's war effort. Ribbentrop still deluded himself that cooperation with the Soviet Union could be permanent or at least last until the war with the United Kingdom had concluded. This opinion was not shared by Adolf Hitler, who still viewed the 'Jewish-Bolshevist' Soviet Union as Germany's inevitable final enemy.
Tripartite Pact
Differences between Germany and Japan, including the Japanese war in China, economic differences, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, led to a growing distance between Germany and Japan. Germany's victories over the European allies in 1940 led to a desire for a reconciliation between the parties. This came to pass as part of the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. However, the Japanese distrust in the German partner remained, and Japan avoided entanglement in Germany's eventual war against the Soviet Union to fully focus on its own struggle in China. In the Tripartite Pact, the Germans and Italians recognized the Japanese leadership in East Asia, and Japan conversely recognized German and Italian leadership in Europe.
Extension of the pact
The Anti-Comintern Pact was scheduled to be renewed on 25 November 1941, as its five-year lifespan since 25 November 1936 was about to run out. One of Germany's primary aims was to keep Japan close and to encourage Japan to intervene in the German–Soviet War on Germany's side, but Japan refused to do so for the rest of the war. The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed in April 1941, would hold up until August 1945, when the Soviet Union violated the 5-year pact and invaded Japanese Manchuria.
China under Wang Jingwei submitted its signature ahead of time on 22 November 1941, the other countries submitted theirs on the day of signing, the 25th. * * * * Nanjing China * * The reaction to the extension in the German state-controlled press, unlike with the previous protocol, was very cold towards Japan and instead emphasized the sacrifices and successes of the European Axis against the Soviet Union in the German–Soviet War. This would not change significantly until 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria had been a country that was stuck between its own expansionist ambitions in the Balkans for which it relied on Italian and German military assistance and diplomatic support, while also trying to avoid major entanglement in Axis operations. Its leader Boris III, hailed as a "liberator czar" and a unifier of lost Bulgarian territories, could only achieve this status due to the military support of the Axis armies, but was intent in 1941 on avoiding Bulgarian involvement in the German–Soviet War on the Eastern Front. This was successful and Bulgarian troops did not participate in Operation Barbarossa, but the permanence of Bulgaria's territorial claims remained completely at the mercy of the Axis Powers, as Germany in particular was hesitant to view any territorial settlement in the Balkans after the Axis victories over Greece and Yugoslavia as final.
As a result, Bulgaria was forced to please the German partner as much as possible while avoiding the final step of open hostilities against the Soviet Union. As part of this pro-German position, Bulgaria was essentially forced into membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. Soon after, on 13 December, the country declared war on the United Kingdom and the United States. Bulgaria tried to maintain neutrality towards the Soviet Union until the end, but after Romania switched sides in favor of the Allies and allowed the Red Army to pass through Romanian territory to invade Bulgaria, the 1944 Bulgarian coup d'état paved the way to the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Tsar Simeon II's regents were executed.
Croatia
Croatia, Germany's most important partner on the Balkans during the anti-partisan campaigns, had been created in 1941 following the German occupation of Yugoslavia. It joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. Such an accession was done with the goal to legitimize the Croatian state and make it look more independent, but also to take a clear stand against the Soviet Union.
Denmark
Denmark had, along with Norway, been occupied by Germany in the wake of Operation Weserübung that started on 9 April 1940. The government in Copenhagen responded to the German assault by having the Danish army stand down and accepting what was framed by Germany as protective occupation. The Danish decision was vastly different from the Norwegian one, as the government in Oslo chose to fight rather than to surrender, and as a result, the German occupation of Denmark was among the lightest of any of the German occupations in Europe.
Still, any notion of Danish independence was merely a sham for the purpose of foreign propaganda, and the German authorities watched their Danish counterparts closely. * Denmark takes up no military obligations. * Anti-communist action in Denmark should be limited to police operations. * The treaty should be limited to Danish territory. * Denmark will remain neutral in World War II. The Germans, somewhat unhappy with these requests, moved them into a secret addendum as a compromise, making Denmark appear as a full member of the pact from the outside. This damaged the international reputation of the Danish civilian government among the Allies.
Finland
The status of Finland during the Second World War remains controversial into the modern day, as historians debate whether Finland was an ally of the Axis Powers, or as claimed by the wartime Finnish government, just in a state of co-belligerence (, ) with Germany in the Continuation War against the Soviet Union. Finnish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941, alongside other elements such as Finland's explicit acknowledgement of having been an ally of "Hitlerite Germany" in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, form the case in favour of arguing that Finland was an ally of the Axis Powers.
Nanjing China
The "Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China," also referred to as "China-Nanjing" or the Wang Jingwei regime, a Japanese puppet state established in Nanjing by the defeated Nationalist Party politician Wang Jingwei in March 1940, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941. It had submitted its signature to the treaty ahead of time, on 22 November.
Romania
Romania was Germany's most militarily important partner in the war against the Soviet Union, but its German partners had done little to actively earn that loyalty. Germany had in quick succession overseen three territorial losses in Romania, when it first awarded the Bessarabia region to the Soviet Union in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, then granted large parts of the Transylvania region to Hungary as part of the Second Vienna Award, and finally approved of Bulgarian territorial gains in the Dobruja region as part of the Treaty of Craiova. Romania, under the leadership of the fascist Iron Guard, thus had its main enemies not only in the Soviet Union, but also among the ranks of the Axis Powers, especially in the form of Hungary.
Still, the Iron Guard, which had before the territorial losses advocated a pro-German position, now viewed alignment with Germany as the only way to avoid another German intervention against Romania and in favor of Hungary. The Romanian participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941 thus arose out of the necessity to please the German partner and to further the Romanian campaign against the Soviet Union, to hopefully regain Bessarabia, and to make territorial acquisitions in Soviet Ukraine.
Slovakia
Slovakia, established in 1939 after the German-instigated dissolution of Czechoslovakia, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941.
Suggested memberships
Between 1936 and 1945, the Axis Powers used the Anti-Comintern Pact as a diplomatic tool to increase their political and diplomatic leverage but were often unsuccessful.
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
There were efforts by Germany to involve the South American ( ABC States"), consisting of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, into the pact. Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas had established the new November 1937 constitution of the Estado Novo under the pretext of communist insurgency, and Brazil was thus considered the prime entry point for the Anti-Comintern Pact in South America. The Brazilian government promised that its domestic anti-communist conviction would continue, but declined entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact on the basis that it did not wish to diplomatically offend the United Kingdom or the United States. However, Brazilian minister showed interest in German help for a Brazilian Anti-Comintern Exhibition similar to the ones that had already been held in Germany.
China
China was part of Ribbentrop's vision for the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1935, and had been courted by both Germany and Japan to join the Anti-Comintern Pact as early as 1936. After serious consideration, the Chiang administration refused. Another attempt at exploratory peace talks was made by for the Chinese side, who had two delegates with Yōsuke Matsuoka in Tokyo on 12 October 1940. Their proposal for peace between Japan and China and the unification of the Wang and Chiang governments also included the entry of the unified Chinese state into the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact was part of the German demands in the run-up to the establishment of the Protectorate. These demands were designed by Germany to be rejected.
Netherlands
The Netherlands were a candidate of choice for the Japanese for inclusion in the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japanese ambassador Iwao Yamaguchi hoped that Dutch concerns about the situation in China and the potential dissent of the ethnic Chinese inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies, as well as communist insurgents in the colony, would lead the Dutch government to attempt to stabilize the relationship with Japan through accession to the pact. Yamaguchi contacted the Dutch foreign minister Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff about the matter on 12 October 1936, but the Dutch government saw itself bound by public opinion to reject any diplomatic alignment with Japan, and De Graeff pointed out that communist activity in the Dutch East Indies was not an imminent threat. However, he was willing to at least negotiate an intelligence exchange with Japan for the purpose of anti-communist activity in Asia.
A second meeting on 24 October 1936 saw De Graeff outline that only the Dutch East Indies should be included in any intelligence exchange, whereas Yamaguchi hoped to include the Dutch mainland for the purpose of thwarting Comintern operations in Amsterdam (and covertly influencing the Dutch newspapers to be less critical of Japan in their reporting). The following day, 25 October 1936, Tony Lovink contacted Yamaguchi about a potential Dutch policy in which not only communism but all political ideologies in the Dutch East Indies could be suppressed and supervised in cooperation with the Japanese. This was the first of many signs that the Dutch government was not greatly concerned about fighting communism, but was much rather concerned with suppressing the Indonesian independence movement in the Dutch East Indies.
Although the Netherlands remained interested in secretive intelligence exchanges, the Dutch government was hesitant to officially undertake a diplomatic alignment with Japan, caused by the fear of domestic and diplomatic backlash.
Norway
As part of the German occupation of Norway and Norway's collaborationist Quisling regime, the accession of Quisling Norway to the Anti-Comintern Pact was discussed, most notably in the German ("Memorandum Regarding the Reorganization of Norway"), issued in Oslo on 10 February 1942.
Poland
In 1935, Poland had been one of the countries that Ribbentrop had hoped to induce to join the pact. Poland rejected this proposal. The reasons for Poland's rejection of the proposal were the Polish desire for a diplomatic equidistance between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as military concerns about encroaching encirclement by Germany after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
Portugal
Portugal was of interest as a possible member state, especially after Spain joined. As one of the only three countries to have voted against the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations on 18 September 1934 (in addition to the Netherlands and Switzerland), it had a well-established anti-Soviet record. However, its economic dependency on and long-standing diplomatic alliance with the United Kingdom made Portugal unlikely to accept an invitation to the Anti-Comintern Pact in the eyes of Oswald Baron von Hoyningen-Huene, the German ambassador to Portugal 1934–1945.
United Kingdom
British membership was part of Ribbentrop's original design for the Anti-Comintern Pact in October 1935.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia was Axis-friendly during the tenure of Milan Stojadinović as Prime Minister, and Germany and Italy were optimistic about its accession in January 1939. Stojadinović was however ousted in February 1939, and the subsequent Cvetković administration was more cautious and non-aligned. The Cvetković administration, pressured by the diplomatic alignment of Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria with the Axis Powers, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact's successor, the Tripartite Pact, on 25 March 1941. in response, Chief of the General Staff Dušan Simović and other officers launched a coup d'état on 27 March, cancelling Yugoslavia's entry into the Tripartite Pact. In response, the Axis Powers initiated the invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April.
Legacy
The Anti-Comintern Pact ended up playing a significant role at the Nuremberg trials and was specifically mentioned in the verdict that sentenced Joachim von Ribbentrop to death.
Historical reception and historiography
American historian Paul W. Schroeder, professor emeritus of the University of Illinois, interprets the Anti-Comintern Pact in his 1958 book The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 as a diplomatic statement by Germany and Japan that had no actual military value and was "hardly dangerous in itself".
See also
*German–Japanese industrial co-operation before and during World War II *Germany–Japan relations *Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941 *Monsun Gruppe *Japan–Soviet Union relations *Japanese military modernization of 1868–1931 *Specific events **Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance (27 March 1936) **Soviet–Japanese Border War (May–September 1939) **Pact of Steel (22 May 1939) **Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939) **Tripartite Pact (27 September 1940) **Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact (13 April 1941) **Soviet invasion of Manchuria (August 1945)
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External links
*Appendix to Presseisen 1958 via Springer Link *Statement by Ribbentrop on the Declaration of War on the Soviet Union 22 June 1941 *The text of the Anti-Comintern Pact *The text of the Supplementary protocol of the Pact *The text of Italian participation to the Pact *The significance of the Anti-Comintern Pact – lecture texts of Yōsuke Matsuoka, printed in 1937